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 Managing a Multiplicity of Interests
The Case of Irregular Migration from Libya
Melissa Phillips
  ABSTRACT: Libya is a signifi cant transit country for irregular migration to Europe and 
is therefore the site of much eff ort by external policy makers, notably the European 
Union. External actors have been unable to formalize workable agreements with Lib-
yan authorities to address or stop onward migration to Europe. Instead, they have been 
forced to develop arrangements with Libya’s neighboring countries to work around 
this impasse. Th is article examines the rhetoric behind eff orts by individual European 
countries and the European Union to implement externally produced migration pol-
icies. From crisis narratives to invoking a humanitarian imperative to “save lives,” it is 
argued that these tropes justify various, at times competing, agendas. Th is results in 
almost no tangible improvement to the situation of irregular migrants or the capacity of 
authorities to deal with irregular migration, with one exception being that of the Libyan 
coast guard. 
  KEYWORDS: irregular migration, Libya, migration systems, refugees, transit, transit 
migration
Introduction
Irregular migration and the false perception that it constitutes a “threat,” mainly to citizens in 
the global North, continues to be a matter of public attention and governmental policy interest 
in many corners of the globe (Andersson 2016a). Th is article investigates the way in which these 
threats are dealt with by external actors using the Central Mediterranean route as an example, 
specifi cally focusing on Libya as a transit country and departure point for irregular migration 
to Europe. It draws on desk-based research, policy analysis, and interviews with two Libyan 
employees of civil society organizations working in Libya on migration.1 Specifi cally, it outlines 
three external approaches that try to address Libya’s irregular migration “problem.” It explains 
how a status quo has been reached in Libya where local groups benefi t from facilitating smug-
gling and traffi  cking, and members of local communities are able to access a cheap, exploitable 
source of labor in undocumented migrants. Diversely positioned and fragmented national and 
local authorities permit smuggling and exploitation both explicitly or by turning a blind eye.
Th e Central Mediterranean route from Libya to Italy is one of three irregular migration 
routes across the Mediterranean that preoccupy (primarily European) policy makers, border 
management offi  cials, and others involved in migration industries.2 It has long been of concern 
to European governments, and Italy in particular as the main receiving country for boat arrivals, 
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evidenced by multiple multilateral and bilateral policy eff orts. Th e level of eff ort is due to the 
relatively high number of people reaching Italy using this route—23,370 in 2018 and 119,369 in 
2017—and the high number of fatalities recorded at sea—638 in 2018 and 1,364 in 2017 (IOM 
2018; UNHCR 2018).3 Policy makers have tended to promote a so-called migration manage-
ment approach (Andersson 2016b; McNevin et al. 2016; Oelgemöller 2011), which is defi ned 
here as “a notion that is mobilized by actors to conceptualize and justify their increasing inter-
ventions in the migration fi eld” through interconnected actors (Geiger and Pécoud 2010: 1).
Th is article shows that the diff erent migration management approaches being promoted 
inside Libya are incoherent. Additionally, there is little consideration as to what constitutes 
“Libyan” interests, as compared to the EU-Turkey statement, which was based on a perceived 
advantage for Turkey, in providing the state-accelerated entry into the European Union. Since 
the 2011 revolution, Libya has been grappling with serious governance, economic, and secu-
rity matters. Th roughout this period there has been no reduction in irregular arrivals by sea, a 
marked increase in the number of deaths, and little change in the policy domain despite a mul-
titude of proposals. Th is lack of policy change is largely due to systemic incoherence, including 
at multilateral and bilateral levels, with the promotion of individual agendas at the expense of 
a coherent and holistic direction. If external actors fail to fi nd ways to align interests, then this 
situation looks set to continue in the near future to the detriment of migrants and refugees. Th e 
result of this will be stasis at the policy level, and an increased number of deaths at sea and of 
migrants and refugees who remain stuck in transit.
Th is article is informed by the many critiques of the securitization of migration (Galemba 
2018; Gerard and Pickering 2014) and builds on research that highlights the central place of 
smuggling and traffi  cking in Libya’s political economy as an economic livelihood that is con-
nected with trade in weapons, drugs, and smuggled goods (Lacher 2014; Phillips and Missbach 
2017a; Raineri 2017; Shaw and Mangan 2014).4 In describing Libya as a transit country, “transit 
is understood as a space that is both constructed and contested,” but also as one that refl ects the 
reality for many migrants and refugees who are oft en themselves in transit, which is “a space 
of great connection, solidarity, disconnection and exploitation” (Phillips and Missbach 2017b: 
114, 118; Missbach and Phillips, this volume). Transit has also become a policy category, and 
“transit state” is used here to explain how Libya is viewed by external political and policy actors 
who remain concerned about people using the country as a departure point for Europe. It also 
considers the perspectives of a diverse group of Libyan actors who would rather see the presence 
of migrants within Libya as a temporary phenomenon.
Th is article fi rst examines Libya’s migration system, then discusses external approaches to 
migration, including the border management approach promoted at an EU-wide level, and 
fi nally focuses on country-level eff orts, with the example cited here of the Italian government. 
All of these approaches and actors are operating concurrently in Libya at the present time. Add-
ing further complexity is the fact that migration is but one agenda among many eff orts to pro-
mote peace and stability in the country. Th ese agendas are driven locally but directed with a 
heavy hand by foreign donors, governments, and international organizations. Th e result is a 
very complex picture of postconfl ict reconstruction and development in a country that is also 
trying to develop a national identity and central government structure (Sayigh 2015).
Analyzing the interconnectedness or disconnectedness of diff erent stakeholders—Libyan 
authorities, other Libyan interests, nongovernment organizations, and European governments—
shows that there are multiple competing agendas. Making a distinction between Libyan interests 
and Libyan authorities, the latter includes detention center authorities, coast guards, and border 
offi  cials whose work comes under the Ministries of Interior and Defence. Th ese entities are most 
oft en the target of foreign-funded migration management policies and programs, and sit within 
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the internationally backed Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli in the west 
of the country. A second rival administration backed by the Libyan National Army (based in 
the east of the country) is fi ghting the GNA for power and control of the country. Given this 
context, Libya is arguably facing more urgent domestic priorities related to economic conditions 
and security than migration (El Zaidy 2017; Phillips and Missbach 2017a).
Libya’s Migration System
Due to its relatively small population, estimated to be just over six million people, Libya has long 
relied on seasonal and temporary migrant labor to fi ll gaps in the domestic labor market and the 
oil sector (Paoletti 2011). Current International Organization for Migration (IOM) fi gures show 
that as at February 2019 there were 666,717 migrants inside the country (IOM 2019). While 
most media attention on Libya has been on present-day human rights abuse of migrants and 
refugees, this reporting oft en lacks a historical understanding as to why migrants fi rst came to 
Libya using inter-African trading routes for the purposes of regional labor migration (Boubakri 
2004; Hamood 2006). Irregular migrants mainly originate from sub-Saharan and West Afri-
can countries where free movement agreements are in place (see Moretti, this volume), joining 
conationals in particular segments of the labor market where, aft er earning money, they can 
return to their country of origin as circular or seasonal migrants (Adepoju 2003).
Prior to the 2011 revolution that removed Muammar Gaddafi  from power, smuggling was 
tightly controlled. It has now opened up to a wider network of smugglers across the country. 
Members of what are oft en denominated as Libya’s southern tribes are still identifi ed as being 
among the main benefi ciaries (Bredeloup and Pliez 2011; Lacher 2014), and other local tribes 
with immense power in Libya’s security vacuum are also recognized as being involved in people 
smuggling (Shaw and Mangan 2014). At the same time, many detention centers are controlled 
by katibas (militias) who benefi t fi nancially from the exploitation of people in detention. Under 
pre-2011 legislation regulating foreign nationals, irregular migration to Libya is considered a 
criminal off ense. Given that most people can only enter Libya irregularly by land, their irregular 
status facilitates their exploitation, as it can go unpunished. Th us, in Libya the migration context 
is one driven by irregularity and illegality—of migrants themselves and of the diverse groups of 
Libyans who profi t from them.
Onward movement of people expressly traveling to Libya with the intention of then being 
smuggled to Europe was not a key concern for external actors until the early 2000s, but even 
then it was managed through bilateral agreements such as the 2008 Treaty on Friendship, Part-
nership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya. Aft er the 2011 revolution and the cessa-
tion of these bilateral agreements with Italy, irregular migration by other nationals departing 
from Libya increased again, with many pointing to the insecure and unpredictable situation for 
migrants and refugees in the country as the driver. However, according to fi gures collected by 
IOM in 2018, the number of people using Libya to transit to Italy remains at around 20 percent 
of the total migrant population.5 Libya is regularly cited by European representatives as one of 
the most important transit sites requiring policy attention. For example, the Maltese prime min-
ister, Joseph Muscat, has called for an agreement on migration similar to the 2016 EU-Turkey 
agreement, saying, “there is no doubt that unless the essence of the Turkey deal is replicated 
in the central Mediterranean, Europe will face a major migration crisis” (quoted in Baczynska 
2017).
In sum, Libya has a long history of intraregional migration, including circular migration, 
labor migration, and irregular migration. Libya’s migration system comprises governmental 
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authorities and a wide range of other interests, including nonstate actors, tribal groups, militias, 
and, to a certain extent, the local population, who all benefi t from irregular migration in one 
way or another. Th is leads to a situation of passive acceptance of the status quo and an ambiv-
alence about for change in a context with many other pressing demands. All of this takes place 
in a country where there is no one central government and where regions that have come to 
be viewed as synonymous with smuggling, such as the south of the country, operate relatively 
autonomously. Migrants and refugees themselves have long been moving in and through Libya 
utilizing well-established migrant community support networks. Similar to many other sites 
along the Central Mediterranean route, irregular migration and smuggling are normalized in 
Libya, compounded by inertia at the level of Libyan authorities. As a result, it is arguably Libyan 
interests that continue to benefi t most as irregular migration thrives. “Libyan interests” include 
marginalized groups who rely on smuggling for a livelihood, border communities who have 
historically been involved in the movement of people, people off ering various services along 
migration routes, and criminal gangs who profi t from smuggling (Raineri 2017).
Multilateral Eff orts Promoting Border Management
European Union–funded measures can be grouped into technological, fi nancial, political, 
and security-centered actions, discussed next, and are underpinned by policy narratives and 
“migration management” tropes justifying EU intervention (Andersson 2016b; Boswell et al. 
2011; Lavenex 2006; McNevin et al. 2016). Technological interventions at borders, such as scan-
ning passports, were intended to be delivered in Libya with the establishment of an EU Border 
Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in 2013, which was announced as the start of an integrated bor-
der management strategy for the country (EUBAM 2016). Th ese tools, which Ruben Anders-
son (2016b) has termed “coercive infrastructure,” were planned for land, sea, and air borders. 
However, the implementation has been slow, with EUBAM only moving into Libya in 2018 
due to security concerns. Th e EU also funds an antismuggling and traffi  cking naval mission, 
EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, which patrols international waters, as well as a Seahorse 
Mediterranean Network that includes the use of drones and radar equipment (Casas-Cortes 
et al. 2016). Large sums of money have been pledged by the EU to address migration in Libya, 
including through technical missions such as EUBAM. Th e EU pledged €90 million in April 
2017 to “protect and assist migrants and the people that host them,” on top of €120 million to 
support authorities (European Commission 2017). Overall, the North Africa window of the EU 
Trust Fund for Africa6 consists of close to €200 million for migration management, with Libya 
a priority country. Funds are dispersed to UN agencies, NGOs, and various institutions of the 
GNA only. Th is great variety of stakeholders highlights one of the biggest political hurdles for 
the EU on how to “manage” migration matters—namely, the absence of one accepted authority 
that can deal with migration across the country.
One local civil society representative interviewed by the author expressed a lack of confi -
dence in these external actions, mainly because of the internal situation in Libya: “I don’t see 
any improvements at least in the near future due to the lack of authorities on the ground, the 
continuous state of lawlessness and political disagreement.”7 Th ere is an absence of insight as 
to the effi  cacy of programs in a context where authorities are not present on the ground, law 
enforcement is partial, and a wider political disagreement keeps the country in a deadlock. It 
could be that “pretending to care,” as has been claimed in other contexts such as Niger, allows 
for funding to continue to fl ow (Raineri 2017: 72). Th is funding benefi ts not only governmental 
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authorities but also international organizations, which are a relatively new presence in Libya, 
where civil society was restricted until 2011.
Despite the local realities, many of the proposed solutions mirror suggestions from other 
contexts where irregular migration is seen through a securitized lens with a preference for 
deterrent-based “solutions,” including immigration detention (Andersson 2016a; Gilbert 2009; 
Grewcock 2014; Raineri 2017). Libya is no exception, and in addition to the investment in bor-
der technology, there has been a proliferation of detention centers since the revolution. In the 
early 2000s, detention center funding came directly from the EU or from Italy, but following 
widespread criticism, the EU now channels assistance, such as food, through international orga-
nizations (Brachet 2016). Inhumane conditions in Libyan detention centers have been well doc-
umented and are characterized by human rights abuses in an environment of arbitrary detention 
(e.g., Amnesty International 2015; Danish Refugee Council 2013; Human Rights Watch 2014). 
Despite the potential for entrenched corruption and the absence of rigorous monitoring due 
to insecurity and large amounts of money being spent rapidly on short-term projects, there is 
an uncritical assumption that EU funding channeled through international organizations will 
protect refugees and migrants at disembarkation points (European Commission 2018). Addi-
tionally, EU funding to build the capacity of Libyan coast guards directly increases the num-
ber of people interdicted at sea and held in detention in Libya. As long as the EU promotes a 
policy that results in fewer irregular arrivals in Europe by boat, there will be an uneasy truce, 
with immigration detention as the least preferred but inevitable consequence of a securitized 
response to irregular migration.
Bilateral Eff orts to Cease Irregular Migration
Italy has always been the country with the greatest stake in Libya, both as a former colonial 
power and as the main point for boat arrivals, and thus it is used here as an example of a state 
with a signifi cant bilateral relationship with Libya on migration (Bredeloup and Pliez 2011; 
Paoletti 2009). Before his ousting, Gaddafi  demonstrated his understanding in negotiations with 
Italy that contestation over migration and mobility are “a symptom and signal of domination in 
international relations,” perhaps best exemplifi ed by his infamous 2010 comment that the EU 
should pay Libya to block the arrival of people moving irregularly or “Europe would turn black” 
(El Qadim 2017: 2). Fear of migrants in Libya remains a signifi cant local issue, as was noted in 
an interview with one civil society representative because of concerns about large numbers of 
undocumented persons in the country, an inability to manage migration in a volatile context, 
and the risk of abuse of migrants particularly due to the increased power that diverse groups of 
smugglers have in the country.8
Th e Italian government made a bold step in 2017 when it allegedly paid militias in key depar-
ture points to stop smuggling (Human Rights Watch 2017). Th is move undermines multilateral 
eff orts described earlier to establish mechanisms for governance by potentially emboldening 
smugglers. It also risks damaging local community relations where, as one interviewee noted, 
“there’s . . . fear of increased control of smugglers over the country, as they make millions . . . 
and stand in the way of having a stabilized state.” Th e 2017 Italian agreement with militias came 
aft er an earlier Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Italy and Libya to which there 
was also a mixed reaction, as according to one observer, “the Libyan public feels that this MoU 
does not seek to help Libya, but is rather a familiar manoeuvre to impose responsibility for bor-
der control and migration management upon Libya and leave it to handle a huge burden alone” 
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(El Zaidy 2017: 3). Th ese actions on the part of Italy neither support the agenda of the EU nor 
address local concerns.
Conclusion: A Cacophony of Irregular Migration Agendas
In all, this article has detailed the multiple migration agendas that can be identifi ed as cur-
rently operating in and acting on Libya. First is Libya’s own internal migration system, which 
is based on a strong domestic political economy of smuggling, a wider ambivalence toward 
irregular migration out of the country, and an acceptance that irregular migrants inside the 
country provide labor. Th e second system is a migration management approach promoted at an 
EU-wide level, which emphasizes technological, fi nancial, political, and security components. 
Signifi cant political agreements made on migration include the Valletta Summit and Khartoum 
Process, from which funding has fl owed mainly to international organizations with local NGOs 
as implementing partners and, to a lesser extent, to government institutions. Technological and 
security programs promote a deterrent-based approach, including measures that bring people 
rescued at sea to immigration detention. At the same time, funding is also provided to inter-
national organizations to assist migrants and refugees in detention and on programs with a 
protection and human rights emphasis. Such a migration system is based on opaque messages, 
promoting an agenda of stopping irregular migration while trying to uphold a humanitarian 
narrative. A third migration system explored above with reference to Italy pertains to bilateral 
approaches. Italy has prioritized its own interests in stopping the number of people reaching 
Italy by sea through agreements with Libya’s GNA and reportedly making agreements directly 
with militias involved in smuggling.
Th e parallel nature of external actions and Libya’s migration system refl ects a collective fail-
ure to target the motivations and drivers of diverse local authorities and interests (Raineri 2017). 
Additionally, the lack of coordination across systems risks placing multiple demands on already 
overstretched and oft en precarious government institutions and creates a wider problem of not 
speaking with one voice (Crawley and Blitz 2018). Th is fi nding supports other research that 
has critiqued “the contradictions of the EU security strategy in the extended neighbourhood” 
(Raineri 2017: 81), and the way in which external policies are based on misunderstandings of 
what drives individuals to move (Crawley and Blitz 2018).
Th e case of Libya detailed in this article highlights the many ways in which a transit country’s 
migration system can be aff ected by external actors who are overly concerned with one com-
ponent of out-migration, which in this case is irregular migration to Europe. Libya’s migration 
system is largely dominated by South-South migration, featuring both circular and seasonal 
migration. However, its designation as a transit country has been given disproportionate atten-
tion, when compared to the actual number of people departing Libya, by European actors who 
are seeking to “manage” migration to and through the country. Th ese actions, which include a 
number of diff erent components, are not aligned with local conditions or local concerns and do 
not always adequately involve appropriate local actors. Furthermore, there is a lack of coordi-
nation between European states and EU institutions. In problematizing irregular migration, as 
governments of so-called destination countries do as detailed in this special section, Northern 
actors are intentionally or otherwise demonstrating a misunderstanding of the issues relevant to 
Southern actors. Th ere remains a need for more research of migration systems within countries 
of transit in the global South that are not solely driven by a focus on irregular out-migration. 
Without this a clear picture of the conditions in countries of transit, especially with regard to 
South-South migration, cannot be established.
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  NOTES
 1. Th ese interviewees were known to the author. Th ey have asked to remain anonymous.
 2. Th e others are the Western Mediterranean route from Morocco to Spain and the Eastern Mediterra-
nean route from Turkey to Greece. With an unknown number of people risking their lives trying to 
reach departure points along sea routes, land routes receive relatively less attention, both in counting 
the number of people who die in desert crossings and those who remain stranded en route during 
“fragmented” or “stepwise” journeys (Collyer 2010; Schapendonk 2010).
 3. All fi gures cited are taken from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Refugee 
Situations Operations Portal (http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations) unless otherwise noted.
 4. While smuggling and traffi  cking are oft en confl ated, there are signifi cant distinctions between the 
two, with traffi  cking having a coercive or deceptive element for the purposes of exploitation. Th is 
article refers to smuggling as “procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a fi nancial or 
other material benefi t, of the illegal entry of a person into a State party of which the person is not a 
national or permanent resident” (United Nations 2000). Th e dominant image of smugglers as violent 
has been widely critiqued, including by Gabriella Sanchez (2017, 2018) and Wendy Vogt (this vol-
ume), who present more nuanced portrayals of the interdependence between smugglers and migrant 
and refugee communities.
 5. Th e Libyan government does not collect fi gures of people in detention or irregular migrants in the 
community.
 6. See “EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa,” ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-
trust-fund/north-africa_en.
 7. Interview, November 2017.
 8. Interview with local civil society representative, November 2017.
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